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The aim of the present paper was to investigate the fundamental ethical issues of Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) on patients
remaining in Persistent Vegetative State (PVS). First, the purpose of this analysis was to discuss the nature of this intervention in
order to classify it such as an ordinary clinical practice, or otherwise as an extraordinary clinical practice or as experimental research.
Second, ethical issues, criticisms, and methodological issues of this intervention, also in the future perspectives, are discussed,
attempting to identify who could give informed consent for a patient in PVS.
1. Background
APersistent Vegetative State (PVS) refers to a disorder of con-
sciousness in which severely brain-injured patients remain
in a state of wakefulness without detectable awareness. In
this extended state of unconsciousness, accompanied by
nearly normal cycles of sleeping and waking, the brainstem
and thalamus are relatively spared, but cortical functional
connectivity is limited or absent. Persistently vegetative
individuals have no signs of awareness of themselves or their
environment. Some may progress to a permanent Vegetative
State (VS), generally 3 months after an anoxic brain event
and 12 months after brain trauma, while others may progress
to a Minimally Conscious State (MCS), in which integrated
but under sustained cortical functions are retained [1, 2]. If
the disorder persists for longer than 12 months after severe
traumatic brain injury, the state is generally considered to be
immutable and no treatment has been shown to accelerate
recovery or improve functional outcome [3, 4]. Nonetheless,
some studies have shown unexpected preservation of large-
scale cerebral networks in MCS patients, a condition charac-
terized by definite behavioral evidence of awareness of self or
the environment [5–9].
Neurostimulation to restore cognitive and physical func-
tions is an innovative and promising technique for treating
patients with severe brain injury. Deep Brain Stimulation
(DBS) has been proposed as an experimental therapeutic
strategy that might produce consistent and sustained effects
of maintaining excitatory activity within functionally dis-
connected forebrain neurons (2012). It is used in treating
in several neurological and psychiatric diseases. Besides its
invasiveness associated with surgical risks and complications,
another major barrier to its wider use, is the syndromic
heterogeneity and variance of subjects who might benefit
from DBS. Furthermore, the selection of potential recipients
of DBS is limited by the current inability to estimate cerebral
function based on bedside examination [4].
2. Deep Brain Stimulation: Clinical Practice
and Experimental Research
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a nonpharmacologic
method to stimulate electrically the deep structures of
human brain. DBS in clinical practice is used as a ther-
apy to treat neurological disorders like Parkinson, essential
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tremor, or dystonia. DBS in scientific research is explored to
treat psychiatric disorders like major depression, obsessive-
compulsive disorders, addiction, or obesity. Despite the large
clinical applications, the precise mechanism of action of DBS
remains uncertain and different and multiple hypothetical
mechanisms are reported [10].
Particular fields of clinical applications of DBS are the
studies conducted on severely brain-injured patients, like
patients remaining in the chronic Minimally Conscious State
(MCS) or in the Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) [11]. MCS
is a clinical condition which differs from PVS by the presence
of inconsistent, but clearly discernible, behavioural evidence
of consciousness [12]: it can be defined as ≪a condition of
severely altered consciousness in which minimal but definite
behavioural evidence of self or environmental awareness
is demonstrated≫ [13]. PVS can be defined as a wakeful
unconscious state or Vegetative State (VS) that lasts longer
than four weeks, whereas the diagnosis of permanence is
classified after approximately one year.
The introduction and the possible therapeutic applica-
tions of DBS in these disorders of consciousness have dis-
covered an amount of ethical issues on different perspectives.
About its real clinical utility defined on the evidence based
medicine, it is also necessary to discuss who could give
the informed consent to DBS, particularly if the patient is
incompetent.
3. Neuroethics and Ethical Issues of DBS
Bioethicists and philosophers have been discussing DBS both
in care and in research projects to identify related fundamen-
tal ethical issues [14, 15]. The common first major topic could
be the controversial possibility, with neural interventions, to
alter the experience of personhood [16, 17].
3.1. Ethical Issues of DBS in Clinical Research. The most
important ethical challenges of DBS in clinical treatment are
described as follows:
(a) balancing associated risks, side effects, complications,
and benefits;
(b) the fair and careful selection of patients: candidates
should be “resistant” patients from other treatments.
Special attention should be given in order to protect
and safeguard the health, the rights, and the interests
of vulnerable groups of patients, like children or
adolescents in pediatric treatment with DBS;
(c) the clear and adequate communication to patients of
the information regarding possible risks and realistic
expectations;
(d) the respect of patients’ autonomy expressed by the
informed consent or dissent to DBS, such as for any
medical intervention;
(e) the principle of Justice with regard to resources
allocation for DBS treatments.
3.2. Ethical Issues of DBS in the Perspective of Scientific
Research. The several ethical implications of DBS in exper-
imental interventions are listed as follows:
(a) the meaning and the value of the research itself;
(b) the proportional and acceptable ratio of risks for
research subjects and potential benefits also in the
interest of future patients;
(c) which participants should be included or excluded in
the experiments: research with DBS should be used
when other procedure options have been exhausted;
(d) promoting high-quality methods of scientific
research;
(e) the participants’ valid informed consent to the
research project, the prompt communication con-
cerning eventual changes of the experiment, and the
respect of their possibility to dissent at any time;
(f) monitoring the safety, the health, and the wellbeing of
participants during the research time;
(g) the respect of their privacy;
(h) the ethical discussion regarding DBS applications
with cognitive human enhancement purpose [18];
(i) the transparency and the independence of the assess-
ment in order to avoid conflict of interests.
4. DBS on the PVS: Ethical Discussion
The most important ethical issue of DBS on PVS is the
patient’s incompetence to consent or dissent to treatment.
Preliminarily to the examination of the core of the matter,
the meanings of the concept of “informed consent” and of
“medical paternalism” are presented below.
4.1. The Medical Paternalism Model. Especially in Latin
Mediterranean countries of Europe, until the second part of
the 20th century, the medical practice has been grounded on
a profound paternalism. The physician decided the medical
interventions for his patients, such as that a father decides
what is right or wrong for the good of his sons.
The fundamentalmoral principles ofmedical paternalism
are the principle of beneficence (which guides the ethical
theory for physicians to do good for the patient in his best
interests) and the principle of nonmaleficence (which states
that the physician must refrain from doing harm toward
patient).
4.2. The Informed Consent Model. Especially after the Sec-
ond World War and the knowledge of the Nazi human
experiments, biomedical ethics in laws [19] and in clinical
practice moved frommedical paternalism ethics to informed
consentmodel that expresses the right of the patient to decide
himself to consent or dissent to diagnostic or therapeutic
interventions proposed by the physician. In the health care
setting, the informed consent process is structured into two
phases.
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(i) In the first moment the physician provides the patient
with the information, in a way that the patient could
understand, regarding the diagnosis, the nature and
the purpose of proposed procedure, the related risks
and benefits, the alternative options, and the conse-
quences of not undergoing the proposed treatment
and its alternative possibilities.
(ii) In the second moment the patient expresses his
voluntary authorization or agreement to proceed and
to undergo the specific medical intervention, or his
decision to refuse it.
The moral foundation of the informed consent proce-
dure is the bioethical principle of autonomy, which suggests
the physician’s duty to respect the patient’s right to self-
determination.
If the person is competent, he owns the ability to give
his informed consent or dissent to clinical treatments as
patient, or to research experiments as participant. In fact,
to give a valid informed consent or dissent to medical
intervention both in clinical practice and in research project,
a requirement of competency must be present.
There are two different rules of procedure to collect the
consent to medical interventions in case of ordinary clinical
practice and in the other cases of extraordinary clinical
practice or of scientific research.
(a) In the case of ordinary clinical practice, which consti-
tutes the basic care aimed at treating a clinical con-
dition, the principles of beneficence and nonmalef-
icence guide the physician in his clinical decisions.
In fact, so long a medical treatment does not have a
significant potential for harmful outcomes, patient’s
informed consent is not perceived to be necessary.
(b) In the other case of extraordinary clinical practice,
which outlines a type of intervention that is usually
highly invasive andmight be considered burdensome
to the patient, the incompetent patient should be
protected in his best interests by an authorized legal
representative (appointed by the judge supervising
cases concerning guardianship), with the authority to
give the informed consent or dissent on behalf of him,
in cooperation with the treating doctor. In Italy this
is also stated by the Italian Civil Code (Italian Civil
Code, art. 414.) and by the Code of good medical
practice or conduct, named “Code of medical deon-
tology” (ItalianCode ofmedical deontology 2006, art.
37.) In this frame, taking also into consideration that
many European countries developed laws concerning
the “advance health care directive or declaration”
(e.g., France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland,
and England.), that is, the so-called “Living will”: a
document that the person uses to set out the medical
care that he wants or does not want in the event that
he becomes incapable of communicating his wishes.
The common legal basis is the European Oviedo
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(see [18]).
Article 9, “Previously expressed wishes”:≪Thepreviously
expressed wishes relating to a medical intervention by a
patient who is not, at the time of the intervention, in a state
to express his or her wishes shall be taken into account≫.
In Italy a law on Living will (already mentioned by
the Code of medical deontology (Italian Code of medical
deontology 2006, artt. 35, 38.)) has been under discussion
[20].
In the case of medical interventions in scientific research
(intended as administration of medical products for clinical
trial), in addition, a previous screening by a local ethics
committee is necessary [21].
4.3. DBS on PVS: Who Gives Informed Consent? As men-
tioned above, presumably the most troubling aspect in
medical ethics of DBS on PVS is the impossibility for the
patient, who is incapable of giving his consent to the practice.
ButDBSonPVS should be intended as an ordinary clinical
practice, or otherwise as an extraordinary clinical practice or
as a scientific research?
The PVS is a chronic neurological disorder of conscious-
ness characterized by wakefulness without awareness. It can
be intended as a special clinical condition produced by
medical interventions. Hence, such as for any other medical
interventions, PVS need a “start-informed consent,” which
could be obtained by
(a) the patient himself, previously discerning his person-
ally expressed wishes when he was still capable, or
eventually following his advance directive (“Living
will”);
(b) each legal patient representative or surrogate.
In case of emergency or without an explicit dissent of the
patient or of his legal representative, the physician could be
the subject of the decision.
In other words, if a patient remain in a PVS (and mea-
sures have not been set in order to interrupt life-sustaining
treatments), a previous explicit or implied consent has been
given. Hence, any ordinary medical procedures and nursing
care, used to monitor and keep the clinical condition of the
PVS hoping to find care to treat the patient, do not need
further consent. On the contrary, in the PVS, procedures
of treatment interruption (the dissent to PVS itself) or of
corrupting physical and mental integrity could be intended
as extraordinary interventions; therefore they need a previous
consent.
The DBS in PVS could be considered an ordinary medical
intervention, because it is neither an interruption treatment
nor a treatment which entails risks of corrupting (physical
and)mental integrity, since in PVS the human brain is already
severely damaged.
In addition, it should be taken into consideration that, on
the one hand, in the special clinical condition of PVS, it is
difficult to be making a worse state.
DBS could not be exclusively regarded as a research
experiment, but, rather, a clinical attempt at therapeutic
treatment with research aspects.
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In conclusion, in case of DBS for PVS, and only
under such circumstance, this medical intervention could
be described as an ordinary care treatment, which does
not call for patient’s consent, and as a clinical attempt at
therapeutic treatment (with research aspects), which does
not call for a previous screening by a local ethics committee,
but only maybe this could be informed of the DBS starting
intervention.
When DBS is applied to a patient in PVS, the hope for a
health benefit for the patient outweighs the risks connected
to DBS intervention. By this way, there is the full respect of
both biomedical ethical principles of beneficence and of non-
maleficence. In addition, there is not conflict with the ethical
principle of patient’s autonomy, because it is already respected
in the beginning of PVS clinical condition, and afterwards it
is confirmed by its persisting state. By this perspective, the
intervention of DBS on a patient in PVS could be applied
respecting the ethical principles that inform it, such as that
inform other fields of medical treatment and research: firstly,
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and autonomy [20].
Our conclusion is that DBS for PVS does not require
informed consent, because
(a) PVS can be intended as a special clinical condition
produced by medical interventions. The pathological
problem lies in the brain status;
(b) such as for any other medical interventions, PVS
needs a “start-informed consent”;
(c) if a patient is in PVS, we could presume that the PVS
started with a previous informed consent, or in a case
of emergency by a decision of the physician;
(d) if a patient persisting in the PVS clinical condition,
it is because his legal representative does not ask
for the interruption of the medical interventions that
implement this clinical condition, otherwise not even
the patient himself asked for that interruption by
“advanced directives” (“Living will”);
(e) if the patient persisting in PVS, anymedical interven-
tion necessary to the PVS itself or to treat the main
problem—the brain status, for example, with a DBS
intervention—does not need further consent.
5. Noninvasive Brain Stimulation
Techniques: A Possible Future Tool for
Testing the Candidate for DBS
Among currently available noninvasive painless stimulation
techniques, single-pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
(TMS) has been demonstrated to be effective for assessing
motor cortex excitability and the integrity of conduction
along the central and peripheral motor pathways. Simi-
larly, repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS)
has been shown to induce prolonged functional changes
in cerebral cortex in normal conditions and therapeutic
effects in different diseases [22]. Several studies suggest that
the thalamocortical system can be engaged in rapid causal
interactions [23–26]. One way to study this phenomenon is
to perturb directly a subset of cortical neurons with TMS and
monitor the brain’s reaction using electroencephalography
(EEG) [27–31].
To date, few studies have focused on the use of TMS
in patients with impaired consciousness [32–35]. Recent
advances in EEG-TMS coregistration have shed new light on
EEG reactivity in humans [36, 37]. For instance, Babiloni et
al. demonstrated a relationship between alpha EEG rhythm
and conscious awareness. They showed that the parietal and
occipital source power of alpha rhythm was high in the
normal subjects, low in the PVS patients who recovered some
level of consciousness at 3-month followup, and practically
null in the PVS patients who did not recover. Their findings
suggest that the sources of alpha rhythm are related to the
outcome of PVS patients at 3-month followup. Corroborating
this hypothesis, our recent study reported the reactivity of
a single MCS patient after brain stimulation, in which an
increase in the alpha band was correlated with functional
improvement [38]. Piccione et al. (2011) and Manganotti et
al. (2013) reported results of a 20Hz rTMS protocol applied
to MCS patients. They highlighted the therapeutic effect of
rTMS concluding that thirty applications of rTMS protocol
may promote clinically significant neurobehavioral recovery
in chronic severe traumatic brain injury [39, 40].
Generally, in behaviorally awake but unresponsive VS
patients, TMS triggers a simple, local slow response that
indicates a breakdown in effective connectivity, similar to that
observed in unconscious sleeping or anaesthetized patients.
In contrast, in MCS patients, who show fluctuating signs
of nonreflexive behavior, TMS seems to trigger complex
activations that sequentially involve distant cortical areas
ipsilateral and contralateral to the site of stimulation.
Evidence from electrophysiological studies of stimulation
over a healthy primary motor cortex (M1) suggests that there
is a progressive increase in the excitability of local circuits
during rTMS, but not only. Remote changes in cortical and
subcortical activity, including associative regions such as the
thalamus, caudate nucleus, and putamen, may be involved in
stimulation.The nature of the remote effect of TMS is not well
understood. The presumed net facilitatory effect on neural
activity in remote regions may be produced by transsynaptic
or direct activation of corticocortical or corticosubcortical
neurons.
The possibility to use noninvasive brain stimulation
techniques in this disease could help to validate the issue of
brain stimulation but, most importantly, could be a test based
on the clinical based medicine to investigate the possible
candidates for implanted stimulator. TMS is only one of the
methods, the most known and the most validated. Probably
we need more studies and clinical trials. The noninvasivity
of this technique lets possible large future studies in this
direction. Other future techniques as the theta burst with
TMS, the Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (TDCS),
or other sensory stimulation can be and should be tested in
order to improve the clinical protocols in these patients.
tDCS is another technique, minimally invasive, that
involves applying weak direct current via electrodes. tDCS
differs from TMS because it only allows for neuromodulation
and not neurostimulation [41] and because the current
Behavioural Neurology 5
applied to the brain is insufficient to induce the rapid shift
in neuronal membrane potentials required to produce action
potentials [42].
6. Conclusions
If the ethical analysis about DBS on PVS discussed in the
present paper [43] is correct, it could be cogent and maybe
much more, for these types of stimulation techniques (TMS
and tDCS), precisely for their non- or less invasive feature.
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